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A Maximum Likelihood Approach to
Combining Forecasts
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin1
Abstract: We model an individual who wants to learn about a state of the world. The
individual has a prior belief, and has data which consists of multiple forecasts about the
state of the world. Our key assumption is that the decision maker identies explanations
that could have generated this data and among these focuses on the ones that maximise the
likelihood of observing the data. The decision maker then bases her nal prediction about the
state on one of these maximum likelihood explanations. We show that in all the maximum
likelihood explanations, moderate forecasts are just statistical derivatives of extreme ones.
Therefore, the decision maker will base her nal prediction only on the information conveyed
in the relatively extreme forecasts. We show that this approach to combining forecasts leads
to a unique prediction and a simple and dynamically consistent way of aggregating opinions.
1 Introduction
In many economic and political situations we nd ourselves confronted with multiple opinions
or forecasts about variables that are important for decision making. In nancial markets we
are often exposed to multiple forecasts about particular stocks or investment possibilities,
when we buy a new laptop we might read multiple reviews either in news outlets or on social
media platforms, and prior to election day we are exposed to multiple polls or to opinions
espoused by friends and colleagues. These di¤erent pieces of information might be important
for our decision making about investments, what we buy or who we vote for.
To aggregate forecasts, individuals need to take a view about how the forecasts are gen-
erated and how they are related to one another. Naturally, multiple forecasts may be corre-
lated. This can arise when we aggregate advice from friends in a connected network, when
election polling rms rely on the same data (as is often the case) or when forecasters in
nancial markets use similar data sources. Indeed, in the last two decades, online communi-
cation has introduced a more complicated web of information sources with potentially higher
1Levy: Department of Economics, LSE, g.levy1@lse.ac.uk. Razin: Department of Economics, LSE,
r.razin@lse.ac.uk. We thank seminar participans in Northwestern, ESSET 2018, Bonn, the editor and two
anonymous referees, as well as Xitong Hui for her research assistance. This project has received funding from
the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 681579.
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degrees of correlation across such forecasts. This complicates the problem of combining fore-
casts and puts into question traditional models that simply assume that individuals have a
prior distribution about all relevant information structures generating these forecasts. One
possible alternative assumption explored in the literature is that individuals use a simple
heuristic, e.g. assume that forecasts are (conditionally) independent and aggregate them
accordingly.2
In this paper, we take a novel approach to this problem: We assume that individuals
aggregate forecasts by looking for the most likely explanation for what they had observed.
That is, we consider a maximum likelihood theory of combining forecasts.3 We model an
individual who wants to learn about a state of the world (nite set of states). The individual
has a prior belief and observes multiple forecasts about the state. These forecasts arrive
sequentially, one in each period. We assume that the individual believes that each forecast
was generated by a Bayesian forecaster but has no prior beliefs about the joint information
structure generating the set of forecasts. Our key assumption is that she identies joint
information structures that had generated the data with the highest likelihood, and bases
her nal prediction on such explanations.
In our main result we characterise the set of maximum likelihood (ML) explanations and
ML predictions that the individual adopts. We show that the ML prediction is unique and
depends only on a small set of forecasts, not more than the number of states. In particular,
the individual who uses a maximum likelihood explanation to combine forecasts will ignore
forecasts that are relatively moderate and focus attention only on a set of extreme forecasts.
The intuition for this result follows from two simple observations. First, to increase the
likelihood of her explanation, the individual looks for correlation between the sources of
information that she thinks have generated the data. Correlated data sources are more likely
to have generated a specic set of forecasts rather than independent sources. This implies
that when interpreting the data through the lens of her explanation, she focuses attention
on a small number of forecasts while ignoring others.
The second observation is that explaining extreme forecasts, that are more distant from
the prior, will involve a lower maximum likelihood. To give an extreme example, consider
the highest likelihood of observing a forecast that puts a probability close to one that the
2See for example DeMarzo et al (2003), Glaeser and Sunstein (2009), Levy and Razin (2015, 2018a) and
Golub and Jackson (2012). Ellis and Piccione (2017) and Levy and Razin (2018b) consider decision makers
who misperceive correlation. Spiegler (2016) analyses a model in which individuals mis-specify the true
causal Bayesian network. Arieli et al (2019) use scoring rules and regret to evaluate forecast aggregation
schemes.
3Such a procedure is in line with legal reasoning where plausible argumentation and balance of probabil-
ities are suggested as normative approaches to the aggregation of information.
2
state is high. To explain this forecast we need to assume that the signals that generated
it were very informative; thus the likelihood of observing this forecast is close to the prior
probability that the state is indeed high. On the other hand, to explain a forecast that
is close to the prior, one can assume an uninformative signal; an uninformative signal can
generate a posterior which is close to the prior with a probability close to one. Therefore,
explaining the extreme views puts an upper bound on the likelihood of any explanation of
the entire data. As we show, the individual can achieve this bound. She explains extreme
views and treats moderate forecasts as noisy derivatives of extreme forecasts.
The above result has several behavioural implications for the dynamic evolution of the ML
prediction. First, ML predictions can exhibit stagnation. When more moderate forecasts are
added to her data set, the decision maker does not change her prediction. Second, the prior
plays an important role; specically, the notion of extreme views is measured with respect
to the prior. As we show, in the long term, limit predictions can depend on the prior even
when individuals are exposed to rich and large amounts of information.
In our model the decision makers misspecied view or narrative of the world is constantly
changing with new observations. But does she have to change her world view drastically
each time she observes a new forecast? We formulate a notion of time consistency across
explanations under which older explanations are never discarded but continue to play a
part in the new narrative the decision maker adopts. We show that the decision maker can
always construct her ML explanations to be time-consistent. Intuitively, new forecasts are
added to the previous explanation by either being correlated to previous extreme ones or
the other way around. Thus, the decision makers world view evolves to accommodate
new forecasts without altering how previous ones are explained. Our formulation of time-
consistency provides a novel normative criterion for such evolving misspecied models of the
world.
A growing literature in economics studies how individuals combine forecasts in a non-
Bayesian manner, with many papers focusing on correlation neglect. In contrast, in our
analysis, decision makers entertain all possible correlation structures: The focus on max-
imising the likelihood implies that decision makers actively look for correlation.4 While
the correlation neglect assumption implies that individuals beliefs become more extreme, in
our model a di¤erent form of extremism arises, as individuals base their prediction only
on relatively extreme forecasts. Our result complements other explanations for this form
of extremism; for example, several papers show how extreme views are more likely to get
into the consideration set of decision makers (either as those who espouse them have greater
4In this sense our approach is related to small-sample biases such as the hot hand fallacy (see Rabin
and Vayanos 2010), where individuals tend to over-infer correlations in the data rather than neglect them.
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incentive to do so, as in Osborne et al 2000 and Levy and Razin 2013, or as they are simpler
to communicate, as in Levy and Razin 2012).
In statistics and economics the ML approach was rst formalised by Fisher (1912) for
the purpose of parameter estimation,5 and by Robbins (1951), Good (1965) and Berger and
Berliner (1986) for the purpose of forming posterior beliefs in the presence of ambiguity.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003), Ortoleva (2012) and Suleymanov (2018) identify axioms that
can rationalize maximum likelihood procedures while Gilboa and Schmeidler (2010) high-
light the trade-o¤ that can arise between maximising likelihood and simplicity. In Epstein
and Schneider (2007), who model learning with ambiguity, a decision maker weeds out ex-
planations that yield a likelihood less than a fraction times the maximum likelihood that can
be achieved. Both Ortoleva (2012) and Epstein and Schneider (2007) use ML as a rene-
ment criterion in extreme (zero or small) probability events, whereas we use ML as the main
reasoning for decisions. Finally, Cherry and Salant (2018) suggest an equilibrium notion
in which players best respond to a sample of their opponents actions, where they make a
statistical inference given this sample. One example they consider is for players to use ML
to estimate the most likely parameter that has generated the sample.
2 The Model
A decision maker is forming a prediction about a state of the world ! 2 
 where 
 is a
nite set. She has a full support prior, p 2 (
). At every period t 2 f1; 2; : : :g, the decision
maker observes a forecast: A forecast qt 2 (
) is a (full support) probability distribution
over 
. Let qt 2 ((
))t denote the vector of forecasts up to period t. At any period t, the
decision makers observed history is qt.
At every t, the decision maker will combine these forecasts and the prior into a prediction,
 2 (
), about the state. We assume that the decision maker thinks that at each period t,
a single forecaster, with the same prior p, receives an informative signal and rationally derives
qt using Bayes rule.
6 To form a prediction, the decision maker will consider explanations,
which are Bayesian models that are consistent with the observations qt and the prior.
We now formally dene what an explanation is. First, we dene a joint information
structure by a tuple I = (S; p; f(s; !)), such that S = tj=1Sj is a nite set of signals and for
s 2 S, f(s; !) is a joint probability distribution over signals and states ! 2 
. Given f(s; !),
5Our analysis di¤ers from the econometrics approach. In particular, our decision maker entertains a new
information structure whenever new information arrives.
6We can extend the analysis to the case of non-common priors. The restrictions that forecasters use Bayes
rule and that the priors are known imply that there is no over-tting. If priors are both not known and not
common then the maximum likelihood of observing a vector of forecasts is one.
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when they are well dened, we have f(sj!), f(!js) and f(s) for all ! 2 
. Moreover, f(s; !)
also implies the marginal distributions over the realisations of signal sj, fj(sjj!).
An explanation of the data implies that any forecast qj in q
t was generated by a Bayesian
forecaster who was exposed to a signal in Sj and knows the marginal distribution on signals
in Sj, fj(sjj!). Formally,
Denition 1 An explanation of qt is e = (Ie; se) where Ie is a joint information structure
and se = (sej)
t
j=1 2 S
e is a realisation of signals such that for all j 2 f1; 2; ::; tg, qj(!) =
Pre(!jsej) =
p(!)fej (s
e
j j!)P
v2
 p(v)f
e
j (s
e
j jv)
.
In other words, the decision maker perceives some information structure I, and a particular
realisation of signals s, such that all the forecasts qj can be rationalised by Bayes rule,
assuming that each forecast qj was based only on the signals generated by fj(sjj!). Note
that this formulation is general in the sense that it allows for the possibility that sj contains
information observed by other forecasters j0 6= j.
Let E(qt) be the set of explanations as dened above. We assume that the decision maker
uses the ML criterion to select which explanation in E(qt) to adopt to set her prediction.
The likelihood of observing qt given an explanation e 2 E(qt) is:
L(qtje) =
X
v2

p(v)f e(sejv)
Below we show that argmaxe2E(qt) L(q
tje) exists, and thus we can dene the ML prediction
as follows:
Assumption 1 (ML prediction): At any period t, the decision makers prediction satises
ML(!jqt) =
p(!)f e^(se^j!)P
v2
 p(v)f
e^(se^jv)
; for some explanation e^ 2 arg max
e2E(qt)
L(qtje)
Before proceeding to characterise ML explanations and predictions we introduce a useful
Lemma that simplies the analysis by reducing the set of explanations to those that have
information structures with binary signals for each forecast:
Lemma 1: Let e = (Ie; se) be an explanation of qt. Then there exists an explanation
e0 = (Ie
0
; se
0
) of qt with Se
0
= fs; s gt, and L(qtje) = L(qtje0).
Intuitively, the decision maker looks for an ex post rationalisation, which implies that she
has in mind a vector of signals attained by all forecasters. As a result, for any information
structure that rationalises the forecasts, we can construct an equivalent information struc-
ture which induces that vector of observed signals with the same probability, and bunches
all other - unobserved - signals together. This new information structure produces the ob-
served forecasts with the same likelihood, and moreover attains this with just two signals
per forecaster.
5
3 The ML Prediction
In this section we characterise the ML prediction. We start with some helpful notation.
Consider a history qt. For any forecast j = 1; : : : ; t, let j(!) =
qj(!)
p(!)
, let j = maxv2
 j(v)
and !j 2 argmaxv2
 j(v). Thus, for each forecast j, !
j can be described as the state that
becomes most surprising given the prior and j is the magnitude of this largest surprise.
Next, note that
j(!
j)
j
= 1, whereas
j(!)
j
 1 for any ! 6= !j. For example, if j
j = 3, and
the prior is uniform, then for a forecast f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g the vector
j(!)
j
is f1; 0:2
0:7
; 0:1
0:7
g. As can
be seen in the proof, j(!)=j(v) is inherently related to the constraint that each forecaster
uses Bayes rule and specically implies the probability that a forecast can be attained at
state !. Moreover, the most surprising state presents the upper bound of attaining a forecast,
which is why the ratio j(!)=j will be important.
With this notation we can characterise the ML prediction of the decision maker:
Proposition 1: Given qt, the ML prediction of the decision maker is unique and equals
to, for any ! 2 
:
ML(!jqt) =
p(!)minj=1;:::;tf
j(!)
j
gP
v2
 p(v)minj=1;:::;tf
j(v)
j
g
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that for any explanation e, for any ! 2 
,
(1)f e(sej!)  min
j=1;:::;t
f ej (s
e
j j!).
As an explanation is an information structure that rationalises qt, we must have for any
!; !0 2 
 :
(2)
qj(!)
qj(!0)
=
p(!)
p(!0)
f ej (s
e
j j!)
f ej (s
e
j j!
0)
.
Choose some state . Equation (2) implies that by setting f ej (s
e
j j) at some level, we pin
down all values f ej (s
e
j j!), for any ! 2 
.
Using (1) and (2), we can write the upper bound for the likelihood of any explanation as:
X
!2

p(!)f e(sej!) 
X
!2

p(!)min
j
ff ej (s
e
j j!)g
= p()[
X
!2

min
j
f
qj(!)
qj()
f ej (s
e
j j)g]
To nd the explanation that maximises the likelihood of observing qt (the left-hand-side
above) we will maximise the right-hand-side and show that we can achieve a likelihood equal
to the maximal upper bound.
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First, to maximize the right-hand-side, note that the problem is increasing in f ej (s
e
j j) for
any j  t. By (2), for any ! 2 
, f ej (s
e
j j!) =
qj(!)
qj()
p()
p(!)
f ej (s
e
j j)  1) f
e
j (s
e
j j) 
p(!)
qj(!)
qj()
p()
for
any ! 2 
. Recall however that !j maximizes
qj(!)
p(!)
and hence imposes the binding constraint
on the upper bound on f ej (s
e
j j). Therefore, we set f
e
j (s
e
j j) at the upper bound,
f ej (s
e
j j) =
p(!j)
p()
qj()
qj(!j)
=
j()
j
We can then use this and (2) to derive for any other !,
f ej (s
e
j j!) =
j(!)
j
.
Second, we construct our ML explanation, e, to attain the upper bound. For any j, let
the set of signals be Sj = fs
; s g. Then set for any !,
f e

j (s
j!) =
j(!)
j
; f e

j (s
 j!) = 1  f e

j (s
j!).
By way of convention, order the signals so that sj is "lower" than s
 
j , and now set the
cumulative marginal as F e

j (s
j!) = f e

j (s
j!) and F e

j (s
 j!) = 1. As we have set the
marginals, we can now set the joint distribution over signals. Note that given that we had
integrated the Bayes rule constraint for each forecast, which imposes how the probability that
a forecast is attained is related across the states, we can focus only on the conditional joint
distributions (that is, conditional on each state !). In particular, the joint unconditional
distribution over signals will be determined rst by the realisation of the state of the world
and then by the distribution over signals conditional on this state.
Fix some ! 2 
. To attain the upper bound on the joint distribution over the observed
signals, designated to be the vector s, set:
(3)F e

(sj!) = f e

(sj!) = min
j
ff e

j (s
j!)g = min
j
f
j(!)
j
g
which implies that F e

(sj!) = minj F
e
j (s
j!). To complete the explanation, continue by
setting, for all s,
F e
s(sj!) = min
j
F e

j (sjj!)
The above is a proper distribution function as given a set of marginals (here, F e

j (sjj!) for
all j  t), there is always a joint distribution function that attains the upper Frechet bound,
which is the one dened above.7
We have constructed an explanation that consists of a set of conditional joint distribution
functions and that achieves the upper bound. Note moreover that any explanation that
7See Joe (1977).
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achieves it, must satisfy f e

(sj!) = minjf
j(!)
j
g for some observed vector of signals s. As
a result, the ML prediction is unique and satises:
ML(!jqt) =
p(!)f e

(sj!)P
v2
 p(v)f
e(sjv)
=
p(!)minj=1;:::;tf
j(!)
j
gP
v2
 p(v)minj=1;:::;tf
j(v)
j
g
which is the expression in the Proposition.
From the above it is clear that only a small set of forecasts would matter, those that mini-
mize
j(!)
j
for some !. Thus, at most j
j forecasts would be relevant for the nal prediction,
whereas other forecasts can be ignored. Moreover, the order in which these forecasts arrive
before or at time t will not alter the prediction at time t: Note also the importance of the
prior: The prior determines
j(!)
j
and hence a¤ects which forecasts can be ignored and how
those that are not ignored are combined into a prediction (we return to the role of the prior
when we consider the limit predictions in Section 4.2).
In Section 3.1 below, we illustrate how the above result translates to a simple prediction
rule in the binary state space, and also construct an example of a ML explanation for t = 2.
The ML explanation involves large degrees of correlation and specically it is moderate fore-
casts that are correlated to extreme ones, and can therefore be ignored in the ML prediction.
We show this feature more generally in section 3.2.
3.1 Binary states: ML prediction and explanation
We now illustrate Proposition 1 (as well as its proof) in the binary state space, 
 = f0; 1g.
Assume without loss of generality a prior of p(1) = p > 1
2
. To simplify, with some abuse of
notation, let qj denote the probability that the state is 1 according to the forecast in period
j. Note that in the binary space, !j = 1 if q > p and !j = 0 if q < p.
Consider for the sake of exposition t = 2, and rst assume that q1 > q2 > p. Thus, both
forecasts support state 1 compared with the prior (so that !1 = !2 = 1).
Suppose, in line with Lemma 1, that each forecaster can receive two signal realisations, s
and s , which, given Bayesian updating, must satisfy then, for some j 2 (0; 1]:
f e(s1 = s
j! = 1) = 1; f
e(s1 = s
j! = 0) = 1
p(1  q1)
q1(1  p)
= 1
1(0)
1
;
f e(s2 = s
j! = 1) = 2; f
e(s2 = s
j! = 0) = 2
p(1  q2)
q2(1  p)
= 2
2(0)
2
Maximising 1 and 2 will increase the marginal probability of attaining the s
 signals for
both forecasters, as qj > p, and so we can set j = 1: We continue then by setting the joint
probability over (s; s) :
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f e(s1 = s
; s2 = s
j! = 1) = 1 = f e(s1 = s
j! = 1)
f e(s1 = s
; s2 = s
j! = 0) = min
j
j(0)
j
=
p(1  q1)
q1(1  p)
= f e(s1 = s
j! = 0):
Forecast 2 will be completely ignored as conditional on s1 = s
, the joint information
structure constructed above necessitates s2 = s
 as well, and so the "observed" signal of
the second forecaster is fully correlated with that of the rst forecaster in each state. This
readily implies the full ML joint information structure, depicted below, where each cell in
each matrix denotes f e(s1; s2j!):
! = 1 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 1 0
s1 = s
  0 0
! = 0 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
0
s1 = s
  p(1 q2)
q2(1 p)
  p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
1  p(1 q2)
q2(1 p)
As a result the ML prediction satises:
 =
p
p+ (1  p)p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
= q1,
implying that the more moderate forecast, q2, is completely ignored.
Assume instead that q2 < p < q1. To increase the likelihood of attaining q2, a forecast
indicating that the state is more likely to be 0 compared with the prior, we need that in
state 1 the second forecaster does not always observe s. Specically, we would now have:
f e(s1 = s
j! = 1) = 1; f e(s1 = s
j! = 0) =
p(1  q1)
q1(1  p)
;
f e(s2 = s
j! = 1) =
(1  p)q2
p(1  q2)
; f e(s2 = s
j! = 0) = 1:
This implies the following joint ML information structure, in which the "observed" signal
of forecaster 1 is a su¢cient statistic for the "observed" signal of forecaster 2 only in state
0, and the other way around in state 1:
! = 1 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 (1 p)q2
p(1 q2)
1  (1 p)q2
p(1 q2)
s1 = s
  0 0
! = 0 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
0
s1 = s
  1  p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
0
As a result, the ML prediction satises now:
 =
p (1 p)q2
p(1 q2)
p (1 p)q2
p(1 q2)
+ (1  p)p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
=
q2q1
q2q1 +
p
1 p
(1  q1)(1  q2)
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Corollary 1, derived from Proposition 1, shows how the above extends to any t:
Corollary 1: Suppose that 
 = f0; 1g. Let qmaxt = maxjt qj and let q
min
t = minjt qj.
For any qt, the ML prediction is:
ML(1jqt) =
8>>>><
>>>>:
qmaxt if q
min
t > p
qmint if q
max
t 6 p
qmint q
max
t
qmint q
max
t +
p
(1 p)
(1 qmint )(1 q
max
t )
otherwise
The implication of Proposition 1 to the binary state space is that at most two forecasts,
the most extreme ones (on each side of the prior), will matter for the ML prediction. All
other - more moderate - forecasts will be ignored.
3.2 Ignoring moderate forecasts
In this section we characterise the set of forecasts that will be ignored in the ML prediction.
Formally, we say that forecast qt+1 is ignored if 
ML(!jqt+1) = ML(!jqt).
Remember that for any forecast qj; j(!) is the ratio of the probability of this state
under the forecast divided by the prior probability. We have also introduced the notation
of j = maxv2
 j(v) and !
j 2 argmaxv2
 j(v). Thus, for each forecast qj, !
j can be
described as the state that becomes most surprising given the prior and j is the magnitude
of this largest surprise.
Going back to the proof of Proposition 1, note that Bayesian updating bounds the proba-
bility that a forecast can be sent at each state !. A forecast qj; which is almost degenerate
on state !j - hence, extreme - can be sent in any other state ! with only a very small proba-
bility as we would have
j(!)
j
 0; otherwise it could not indicate to a rational forecaster that
the state is most likely to be !j. Thus, this forecast would bound the joint probability of
obtaining all forecasts in all states ! 6= !j and would therefore matter for the ML prediction.
On the other hand, a moderate forecast which agrees with the prior, qj(!) = p(!), can be
sent in each state ! with probability (!)
j
= 1: It will then never impose a bound on the
joint probability distribution and would not a¤ect the ML prediction. We now characterise
the set of moderate forecasts, such as above, that will be ignored in the nal aggregation of
forecasts. Let:
I(qt) =
(
qt+1 2 (
)j
8v 2 
; t+1(v)
t+1
 minjt
j(v)
j
and 9! 2 
 such that t+1(!)
t+1
= minjt
j(!)
j
)
The set I(qt) denes the boundary of the set of all forecasts that the decision maker will
be able to ignore at period t + 1: This boundary set contains forecasts that minimise
j(!)
j
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for some state !; for j  t; and hence contains forecasts that have not been ignored up to
and including period t: To gain intuition, let us consider the set I(qt) in the case of binary
states. Suppose that minjt qj < p < maxjt qj: Assume without loss of generality that
maxjt qj > 1 minjt qj so that j = maxjt qj. In this case we have that
min
jt
j(1)
j
=
minjt qj
maxjt qj
and min
jt
j(0)
j
=
1 maxjt qj
maxjt qj
:
Therefore, if qt+1 = maxjt qj then
t+1(1)
t+1
= 1 >
minjt qj
maxjt qj
and
t+1(0)
t+1
=
1 maxjt qj
maxjt qj
= min
jt
j(0)
j
:
Similarly when qt+1 = minjt qj we have that
t+1(1)
t+1
=
minjt qj
maxjt qj
= min
jt
j(1)
j
and
t+1(0)
t+1
=
1 minjt qj
maxjt qj
>
1 maxjt qj
maxjt qj
= min
jt
j(0)
j
:
For any qt+1 2 (minjt qj;maxjt qj) both inequalities will be strict and for any qt+1 =2
[minjt qj;maxjt qj] one of the inequalities will hold in the opposite way. As a result, in this
case we have I(qt) = fminjt qj;maxjt qjg.
Using the denition of the set I(qt) we show for the general state space:
Lemma 2: For any q 2 I(qt) and  2 [0; 1], the forecast qt+1 = p+ (1  )q is ignored.
If we dene moderation by the distance to the prior, Lemma 2 implies that all forecasts
that are more moderate (weakly) than those in I(qt) will be ignored. In the case of binary
states, when minjt qj < p < maxjt qj, we saw above that I(q
t) = fminjt qj;maxjt qjg.
Thus, all more moderate forecasts on [minjt qj; p] and on [p;maxjt qj] will be ignored. To
see another example, consider a tertiary state space, 
 = f0; 1; 2g. With equal prior, the
forecast f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g allows us to ignore all forecasts for whom the vector
j(!)
j
is at least,
element by element, f1; 0:2
0:7
; 0:1
0:7
g. The set of such ignored forecasts is depicted in Figure 1.
As can be seen, it is all those that have the same mode, at ! = 0, and lie on the line that
connects each point on the closure to the prior.
Figure 2 shows the set of forecasts that will be ignored when f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g is observed,
and the set of forecasts that will be ignored when f0:2; 0:1; 0:7g is observed. These are the
two light shaded areas in the gure. The set of forecasts that will be ignored when both
f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g and f0:2; 0:1; 0:7g are observed includes more forecasts than just the union of
the above two sets. The additional forecasts that will be ignored when both f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g
and f0:2; 0:1; 0:7g are observed is given by the darker shaded area in the gure. Thus the
total set of forecasts that will be ignored when both f0:7; 0:2; 0:1g and f0:2; 0:1; 0:7g are
observed includes the union of the three shaded areas depicted in the gure.
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3.3 Time consistency of ML explanations
The ML decision maker has potentially a wrong model in mind, and with every new obser-
vation she adopts a di¤erent world view or narrative to interpret the accumulated data
she has observed. However, if the procedure calls for a completely new model each period,
we might question the sensibility of this method of aggregating data. Moreover, such a pro-
cedure would imply higher computation costs, as each period a new model would need to be
calculated.
Below we formalise a notion of consistency between explanations and show that the ML
explanation can evolve in a time-consistent manner. Let e be an explanation of qt and e0
an explanation of qt+1. We say that e0 is time consistent with e if Se
0
= Se  St+1 for some
nite set St+1 and for any s 2 S
e; ! 2 
,
f e(sj!) =
X
(s;st+1)2Se
0
f e
0
(s; st+1j!)
In words, f e(sj!), the probability of observing s in explanation e is equal to the expected
probability of observing signal realisations s in the rst t periods under explanation e0. This
implies that the explanation e for the rst t observations is the projection of e0 to these t
observation. As a result if there is time consistency between e and e0 we can say that when
moving from period t to period t + 1, the decision maker keeps, in a statistical sense, her
explanation for the rst t observations.
We can then show:
Proposition 2: For any explanation of e of qt, for any observation qt+1, there exists an
ML explanation e0 of (qt; qt+1) which is time consistent with e.
Intuitively, for any state !, there are two cases: Either the new forecast is ignored, which
means that the probability of observing it is higher than observing a previous one and so we
can fully correlate it with the previous vector of forecasts and peg the remaining probability
of observing the new forecast on to the other, unobserved, realisations of the rst t forecasts.
Or, old forecasts are ignored so we fully correlate old forecasts to the new one and the
remaining probability of observing the old forecasts is pegged on to other (unobserved)
realisations of the t + 1 forecast. As a result, the decision maker does not need to come up
with a completely new ML explanation each time and can be consistent in how she explains
her data over time.
To get more intuition, recall the joint information structure described in the case of binary
states, when q1 > q2 > p, which, for the observed signals, satised:
f e(s1 = s
; s2 = s
j! = 1) = 1; f e(s1 = s
; s2 = s
j! = 0) =
p(1  q1)
q1(1  p)
.
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Assume that we now observe some q3 where specically we have q3 < p, for which the ML
information structure will demand a marginal probability of:
f e(s3 = s
j! = 1) =
(1  p)q3
p(1  q3)
; f e(s3 = s
 j! = 0) = 1
Consider the following joint ML structure, where we combine the above marginal of the
rst two signals, s1 and s2, with that of s3. First, we describe f
e(s1; s2; s3 = s
j1) and
f e(s1; s2; s3 = s
 j1) :
! = 1; s3 = s
 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 (1 p)q3
p(1 q3)
0
s1 = s
  0 0
,
! = 1; s3 = s
  s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 1  (1 p)q3
p(1 q3)
0
s1 = s
  0 0
We now depict f e(s1; s2; s3 = s
j0) and f e(s1; s2; s3 = s
 j0) :
! = 0; s3 = s
 s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
p(1 q2)
q2(1 p)
  p(1 q1)
q1(1 p)
s1 = s
  0 1  p(1 q2)
q2(1 p)
,
! = 0; s3 = s
  s2 = s
 s2 = s
 
s1 = s
 0 0
s1 = s
  0 0
The marginal distribution over s1; s2 derived from the above is exactly as it is for the
two signals generating q1 > q2 > p, as described in Section 3.1. Moreover, following from
Proposition 1, the above is an ML information structure.
The forecast q3 cannot be ignored and the signal generating it, s3 = s
, has the minimum
probability of being attained in state 1 compared with the probability of attaining s1 = s2 =
s. As a result, these signals are fully correlated to s3 = s
 in state 1 and the remaining
probability of attaining s1 = s2 = s
 in this state is pegged on to the (non) observation of
s3 = s
 . In state 0, the joint probability of attaining s1 = s2 = s
 is lower than that of
s3 = s
; which is one. As a result, s3 = s
 arises whenever s1 = s2 = s
 arises but also arises
for other congurations of these signals. The proof in the Appendix uses similar arguments
to construct a time-consistent joint distribution between the marginal of the rst t signals
and the additional signal arising in the t+ 1th period.
4 Extensions
We consider two extensions. In the rst one we analyse a model in which the decision maker
does not observe forecasts but only the history of her past ML predictions. The second
extension looks at limit predictions, and highlights the importance of the prior belief in
the ML process. To simplify the exposition, we henceforth focus on a binary state space

 = f0; 1g. Thus a forecast qj simply denotes the probability that the state is 1.
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4.1 Source amnesia
We have so far assumed that the decision maker remembers the history of forecasts she has
seen. We now consider an extension to a decision maker that does not remember forecasts
but does remember her past predictions. This form of memory is termed source amnesia in
the psychological literature.8
Specically, in our previous model, at time t, the decision maker observes qt = (q1; q2; : : : ; qt).
We now assume that at time t, a decision maker observes qt, and 
t 1 = (1; 2; : : : ; t 1),
where j is the ML prediction at period j.
Assume that the prior is uniform, and suppose without loss of generality that q1 >
1
2
. Let
us consider Period 3, where the decision maker observes q3, 2 and 1 = q1. She knows that
for whichever q2 she imagines, it has to be that 2 = 
ML(:jq2). By Corollary 1, if 2  q1,
then 2 = q2. If 2 = q1, then q1 > q2 >
1
2
and it is not important for her to know the exact
value of q2. If 2 < q1, then q2 =
2(1 q1)
q1+2(1 2q1)
. Thus, in Period 3 she either knows q2 or knows
that it should be ignored. It follows then that at Period t, for each j < t, she either knows
qj or knows that it could be ignored. We therefore have:
Proposition 3: A decision maker that has source amnesia will have the same ML pre-
diction as a decision maker that remembers the history of forecasts.
Remark 1 (Social learning): Social learning is typically modelled as an environment in
which an individual at period t observes the sequence of the actions or predictions of her
predecessors, as well as her own forecast. Thus as above, adopting social learning (with
observed beliefs) to our setup, she will observe t 1 = f1; 2; : : : ; t 1g, as well as qt. If
we assume that every decision maker believes that every one before her also uses the ML
procedure, and that this is common knowledge, then the problem becomes identical to the
single agent problem. Given this, all the results above hold. Specically, when all previous
predictions are observed, then the sequence of predictions will be identical to the one that
arises if all forecasts were shared instead.
4.2 The Persistence of the prior
In this section we explore the convergence properties of the ML predictions. The key observa-
tion that we highlight is the importance of the prior in the limit ML predictions. Specically,
we show that even when exposed to a large data set, the individuals limit belief might still
depend on her initial prior.
8See for example Schacter et al (1984).
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To focus our discussion, assume a true information generating process by which sig-
nals are drawn in an iid manner each period. In particular, assume that the information
structure induces a distribution F over forecasts in (0; 1), with a = inf(SupportF ) and
b = sup(SupportF ). Assume that the prior p satises p 2 (a; b) and 0  a < b  1, so
that the posteriors are informative. When the individual observes forecasts drawn from this
process, where would her predictions converge to?
Proposition 4:
(i) Suppose that a > 0 and b < 1: The prediction of the ML decision maker satises for
any " > 0
lim
t!1
Pr[ML(1jqt) 2 (
1
1 + p
1 p
(1 a)
b
(1 b)
a
  ";
1
1 + p
1 p
(1 a)
b
(1 b)
a
+ ")] = 1:
(ii) Suppose that a = 0 and b = 1: There exist distributions F for which for any ";  > 0,
lim
t!1
Pr[ML(1jqt) 2 (p  "; p+ ")] > .
The ML decision maker will update just based on the extreme forecasts she has observed
along the sequence, on each side of the prior. To see (i), note that in the limit, by the
law of large numbers, these extreme forecasts will converge to be a and b. Therefore, by
Proposition 1, the ML prediction will converge to the expression in the Proposition. As
0 < (1 a)
b
(1 b)
a
<1, the limit prediction still depends on the prior.
But what happens when [a; b] = [0; 1], that is when we have a rich signal structure that can
induce posteriors of unlimited accuracy? For case (ii) we need to look at the limit statistical
properties of ~qmaxt and ~q
min
t as they will determine whether the two posteriors will converge
or not. Specically, consider a distribution over posteriors conditional on the state ! = 1:
Given that the state is 1, the probability of observing a posterior close to 0 must be close to
zero. This is because such a posterior is based on Bayesian updating and so for a forecaster
to believe that the state is likely to be 0, it must be that this posterior is sent in state 1
only with a small probability. This implies that the distribution over posteriors given ! = 1
must have a thin tail around zero. But this distribution can also have a similar thin tail
around posteriors that are close to 1. Extreme value theory tells us that we can construct
distributions of ~qmaxt and ~q
min
t to accord, in the limit, with the Gumbel distribution.
9 This
allows us to construct information structures for which there is a strictly positive probability
that the limit of the ratio
1 ~qmaxt
~qmint
is bounded and equals one, resulting in the ML belief
converging to the prior p.
Remark 2 (Divergence): Consider now two ML decision makers with di¤erent priors,
where each assumes that the forecasts she observes are generated according to an information
9For example see Fisher and Tippet (1928).
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structure incorporating her own prior. The above result implies that there is a strictly
positive probability of divergence between the two ML predictions they will generate, even
after being exposed to the same rich and large set of observations. This di¤ers from the
convergence properties of Bayesian decision makers with heterogeneous priors. For example,
in a recent paper Acemoglu et al (2016) show that decision makers with heterogeneous priors,
who agree about the information process generating their signals, will converge to have the
same beliefs.10
5 Conclusion
There is some recent empirical and experimental evidence showing that decision makers
tend to neglect correlation in some environments (e.g., Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), Enke
and Zimmerman (2019), Kallir and Sonsino (2009) and Eyster and Weiszacker (2011)) while
in other contexts they overestimate correlation: Consistent with the maximum likelihood
approach we assumed in this paper, De Filippis et al (2017) and Hossain and Okui (2018),
derive results in which subjects sometimes overestimate the level of correlation.11 It would
be interesting to understand empirically when it is more likely for decision makers to become
aware of, or alternatively excessively consider, correlation in their observed forecasts. One
possibility is that observing many repeated forecasts will increase the suspicion of the decision
maker that these are correlated. One interesting example for such reasoning is the Talmudic
Sanhedrin court law that requires that if judges are unanimous in conviction, the defendant
should be set free, while if only a majority convict, this majority verdict pertains. Glatt
(2013) o¤ers a maximum likelihood rationalisation of this rule; unanimity among many
judges most likely is a result of strong correlation between the judges, and therefore demands
caution. Gunn et al (2016) discuss this interpretation also in other legal scenarios.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that e = (Ie; se) is an explanation of qt. We will construct a
new explanation of qt with Sj = fs
; s g for any j, which maintains the same likelihood of
observing qt as e does.
10See section 3.1 in their paper. The paper uses this result as a benchmark to show, in the main part of
the paper, that small disagreement about the information generating process can imply large disagreements
about where the process converges to.
11Specically, De Filippis et al (2017) consider a class of updating rules that generalize the ML updating
one, and their experimental evidence supports the rule with a biased cirtical value (rather than an unbiased
one).
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Specically, construct the new explanation e0 = (Ie
0
; se
0
) as follows. Let se
0
= (s; s; : : : ; s).
Let, 8! 2 
 :
()f e
0
j (s
j!) = f ej (s
e
j j!) for all j  t; f
e0(s; s; : : : ; sj!) = f e(sej!)
and 8s 6= s; s 2 fs; s gt,
f e
0
(sj!) =
X
s
0 2 Se s.t.
if sj = s
 then s0j = s
e
j
otherwise s0j 6= s
e
j
f e(s0j!)
Note that by (), e0 is an explanation of qt, as the marginal distributions of the observed
signals are maintained. Moreover, by (), it is an explanation which maintains the same
likelihood of observing qt as e induces.
Proof of Lemma 2: We start by showing that a forecast qh = p + (1   )ql can be
ignored if ql 2 I(q
t), for any  2 (0; 1]. To see this, note rst that !h = !l : this arises
as argmax!
qh(!)
p(!)
= argmax!
p(!)+(1 )ql(!)
p(!)
= argmax!( + (1   )
ql(!)
p(!)
) = argmax!
ql(!)
p(!)
.
Then note that for any !, h(!)
h
=
qh(!)
p(!)
qh(!
l)
p(!l)
=
p(!)+(1 )ql(!)
p(!)
p(!l)+(1 )ql(!
l)
p(!l)
=
+(1 )
ql(!)
p(!)
+(1 )
ql(!
l)
p(!l)

ql(!)
p(!)
ql(!
l)
p(!l)
= l(!)
l
.
Now note that all forecasts in qt+1 2 I(q
t) can be ignored by Proposition 1. As a result
of this and the above all forecasts qt+1 = p+ (1  )q for some q 2 I(q
t) and  2 [0; 1] can
be ignored.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that et = (I
et ; se

t ) is a ML explanation of qt. Recall
that by Proposition 1, any ML explanation requires that f e(sej!) = minj2f1;2;::;tg
j(!)
j
.
We now construct a new ML explanation, et+1 for q
t+1 which is consistent with et . To
construct et+1 = (I
et+1 ; se

t+1) we set:
(i) Se

t+1 = t+1j=1S
et+1
j , with
t
j=1S
et+1
j = S
et , S
et+1
t+1 = fs
et+1
t+1 ; s
e t+1
t+1 g and s
et+1 = (s
et+1
1 ; : : : s
et+1
t ; s
et+1
t+1 )
such that (s
et+1
1 ; : : : ; s
et+1
t ) = s
et .
(ii) f
et+1
j (s
et+1
j j!) =
j(!)
j
for all j  t+ 1:
(iii) The marginal of f e

t+1(:j!) on Se

t to equal f e

t (:j!).
We now set two cumulative marginals: on the rst t signals, and on the t + 1th signal.
Order signals in S
et+1
j as a normalisation so that s
et+1
j is the smallest in S
et+1
j . This, and
(i)-(iii), implies that we have:
F
et+1
t+1 (s
et+1
t+1 j!) = f
et+1
t+1 (s
et+1
t+1 j!); F
et+1
t+1 (s
e t+1
t+1 j!) = 1
F e

t+1(se

t j!) = f e

t+1(se

t j!) = f e

t (se

t j!)
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where the remainder of F e

t+1(stj!) on st 2 Se

t , st 6= se

t , can be completed using (iii).
We conclude the construction by setting the joint distribution on Se

t+1 , combining the
marginals F e

t+1(stj!) and F
et+1
t+1 (st+1j!). We rst consider s
et+1 . For each state !, and se

t+1,
we set:
()F e

t+1(se

t+1j!) = f e

t+1(se

t+1 j!) =
= minff
et+1
t+1 (s
et+1
t+1 j!); f
et+1(se

t j!)g = minfF
et+1
t+1 (s
et+1
t+1 j!); F
et+1(se

t j!)g
Next, as we did in Proposition 1, for all other s = fst; st+1g 6= s
et+1, we set
F e

t+1(sj!) = minfF
et+1
t+1 (st+1j!); F
et (stj!)g.
This will be a proper cdf as there is always a joint information structure which achieves
the upper Frechet bound.
We have therefore constructed an explanation et+1 which: (a) explains the data by
(ii); (b) maximises the likelihood of the data, as by (), (ii) and (iii), f e

t+1(se

t+1 j!) =
minj2f1;2;::;t+1g
j(!)
j
; (c) is time-consistent by construction, following (iii).
Proof of Proposition 3: In text.
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) This is a corollary of Proposition 1 and the law of large
numbers. (ii) In what follows we will denote a forecast about the state by q 2 [0; 1], inter-
preted as the probability of state 1, where p is the prior probability that the state is 1. We
will construct a true signal generating process by choosing the cumulative distributions over
posteriors it generates, F (qj1) in state 1 and F (qj0) in state 0, with corresponding continuous
densities f(qj1) and f(qj0).
Let us focus on state ! = 0 and hence on F (qj0). We consider a distribution that has
symmetric tails so that F (qj0) = 1 F (1 qj0) for all q > q^ for some q^ > 0:5. To approximate
the limit distribution of the extreme posteriors we note that these are the extreme values of
F (qj0). We can therefore use the extreme value limit results in Fisher and Tippett (1928)
and Leadbetter et al (1983). In particular, we construct F (qj0) to satisfy the following:
9(q) > 0 such that lim
q!1
1  F (q + x(q)j0)
1  F (qj0)
= e x for any x 2 R.
By Leadbetter et al (1983) for distributions that satisfy the above condition, there exists
sequences fang, fbng such that an = (F
 1(1  1
n
))! 0 and bn = F
 1(1  1
n
)! 1 so that we
can use the Gumbel distribution to approximate the distribution of the maximal posterior
of F (qj0), maxVn:
maxVn   bn
an
 expf  exp( 
maxVn   bn
an
)g,
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So if we choose two cuto¤s 0 < n < n < 1 such that
n bn
an
! , n bn
an
!  and  >  we
have that the probabilitymaxVn 2 [n; n] converges to expf  exp()g expf  exp()g > 0:
Similarly, by symmetry, for the minimum value minVn we will have that the probability
minVn 2 [1  n; 1  n] converges to expf  exp()g   expf  exp()g.
Note that as 1 F (q+x(q)j0)
1 F (qj0)
!q!1 e
 x for any x 2 R this implies that for large enough q,
q + x(q)  1, and so we have (q) < 1 q
x
for any x 2 R. As a result we have that,
1  n
1  n
'
1  bn   an
1  bn   an
=
1 bn
an
  
1 bn
an
  
! 1
as for large enough q, 1 bn
an
=
1 F 1(1  1
n
)
(F 1(1  1
n
))
> x
1 F 1(1  1
n
)
1 F 1(1  1
n
)
= x for any x 2 R.
Therefore, with probability (expf  exp()g   expf  exp()g)2 we have that
1 
1  n
1  n
<
1 maxVn
minVn
<
1  n
1  n
! 1
Moreover, note that 1 minVn
maxVn
! 1: Therefore, there is a strictly positive probability
that the prior will matter for the limit prediction, or in other words, with probability
(expf  exp()g   expf  exp()g)2,
 =
1
1 + 1 p
p
1 maxVn
minVn
1 minVn
maxVn
!n!1 p.
Finally, we need to check that the above can indeed be constructed as distribution over
posteriors. A distribution over posteriors arising from Bayesian updating implies a joint
restriction on f(qj1) and f(qj0) so that for any q:
q =
pf(qj! = 1)
pf(qj! = 1) + (1  p)f(qj! = 0)
) f(qj1) = f(qj0)
(1  p)
p
q
1  q
:12
When for example considering the "tails" of f(qj1) and f(qj0), the above means that
when q ! 0, assuming that f(qj0) < 1 then f(qj1) ! 0 at a certain rate. Similarly,
f(qj0) = f(qj1) p
1 p
1 q
q
so that, assuming that f(qj1) < 1, as q ! 1 then f(qj0) ! 0 at
a certain rate. However, given that our approximation implies that f(qj0) drops to zero
around the tails very quickly, specically, as f(qj0) !q!1 0 faster than
q
1 q
!q!1 1, then
we can indeed construct f(qj1) as a probability distribution so that they can jointly satisfy
the above Bayesian restriction.
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